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Entrapment in Cyberspace:
A Renewed Call for Reasonable Suspicion
Jarrod S. Hansont
DRoach, as the man identified himself, began a relationship
with a thirteen-year-old girl on a computer chat group.' In time,
DRoach's messages began to discuss sex. Soon, pictures accompa-
nied his words.2 Through these messages and pictures, DRoach
made his sexual interest in his prospective victim clear.3 He
eventually asked the girl to meet him discreetly and to bring
money to help pay for a motel room for their use.4 When he ar-
rived at the meeting point, he did not find a thirteen-year-old
girl.5 Instead, he found the police waiting to charge him with
attempted carnal intercourse with a minor, attempted lewd and
lascivious acts with a minor, and twenty-three counts of promot-
ing or possessing child pornography.6 The thirteen-year-old girl
was actually a thirty-three-year-old law enforcement agent.
This incident illustrates two dangers. First, it demonstrates
that cyberspace provides a new forum for criminal activity. Child
pornography and sex crimes are two of many crimes that people
can commit online. Fraud, theft, libel, and consensual crimes,
such as pornography and trafficking in illegal information, have
also found their way into cyberspace.8 Second, the DRoach inci-
dent illustrates the potential for overzealous law enforcement in
cyberspace. Police officers,9 service providers,' ° and private
t BA 1994, University of Denver; J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Chicago.
' Monica Davey, Vice Squad Sleuths the Internet, St. Petersburg Times 1B (Aug 13,
1995).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
' Davey, St. Petersburg Times at 5B (cited in note 1).
6 Id.
Id.
See Edward A. Cavazos and Gavino Morin, Cyberspace and the Law: Your Rights
and Duties in the Online World 78, 89, 107, 117-18 (MIT Press, 1994).
' See Jan Vertefeuille, Hypersting Net Draws in Local Man, Roanoke Times Al (Sept
27, 1995) (describing a bulletin board law enforcement officials have set up to catch people
stealing credit card numbers and cellular phone account numbers).
o See Davey, St. Petersburg Times at 5B (cited in note 1).
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individuals"1 are eager to combat crime in cyberspace and can
be creative in their efforts to do so.
The ease with which law enforcement officials can assume
false identities in cyberspace and the suitability of cyberspace for
consensual or victimless crimes indicate a probable increase in
undercover sting operations. Defendants are therefore likely to
invoke the entrapment defense with increasing frequency.
In light of the new stress placed on entrapment, courts will
need to revisit the defense to determine whether it will serve its
original purposes when applied to cyberspace. This Comment
argues that the current entrapment doctrines as applied to
cyberspace do not effectively address the concerns behind the
entrapment defense. It argues that requiring law enforcement to
meet a reasonable-suspicion standard before engaging in under-
cover operations would better address those concerns. Many com-
mentators have called for the application of a reasonable-suspi-
cion standard outside cyberspace. This Comment renews their
call for a reasonable-suspicion standard in all undercover opera-
tions by illustrating how such a standard would be more effective
in cyberspace than the current entrapment test. Part I outlines
the origins of the two tests for the entrapment defense in the
federal courts and argues that both tests are striving for the
same two goals. Part II illustrates how neither of the two court-
created tests accomplishes the dual goals of limiting police activi-
ty and protecting the innocent when applied to situations in
cyberspace. Finally, Part III argues that a reasonable-suspicion
standard for police conduct would best accomplish the entrap-
ment defense's policy goals in cyberspace.
" See Peter H. Lewis, Nevada Man Finds FBI Waiting after Setting up Internet
Tryst, San Francisco Chronicle A6 (July 14, 1995) (describing a private investigator who
posed as a fourteen-year-old girl on the Internet and provided information to law enforce-
ment officers when a man asked to meet her to have sex).
" See Comment, Lead Us Not into (Unwarranted) Temptation: A Proposal to Replace
the Entrapment Defense with a Reasonable-Suspicion Requirement, 133 U Pa L Rev 1193,
1216 (1985); Note, The Government as Pornographer: Government Sting Operations and
Entrapment: United States v. Jacobson 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S.Ct. 1535
(1992), 61 U Cin L Rev 1067, 1088-94 (1993); Comment, If the Postman Always "Stings"
Twice, Who Is the Next Target?-An Examination of the Entrapment Theory, 19 J
Contemp L 217, 244 (1993); Note, United States v. Jacobson: A Call for Reasonable
Suspicion of Criminal Activity as a Threshold Limitation on Governmental Sting Opera-
tions, 44 Ark L Rev 493, 510 (1991).
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
Courts have long recognized the need for police to use decep-
tion to catch criminals. 13 They have also recognized the potential
dangers of such a practice." The entrapment defense responds
to these concerns about police involvement in undercover activi-
ties.
The Supreme Court has developed two tests, the subjective
and objective tests, to examine the propriety of undercover police
activities." Both tests seek to advance the same policy objec-
tives: preventing the abuse of police authority and protecting the
"otherwise innocent"-those people who would be innocent of
wrongdoing absent police inducement.16
A. The Subjective Test for Entrapment
The Supreme Court first announced the entrapment defense
in Sorrells v United States. 7 In Sorrells, a government agent
went undercover to investigate violations of the National Prohibi-
tion Act. 8 Three of Sorrells's acquaintances introduced him to
the agent."9 The agent and one of the acquaintances discovered
that they had served in the same military division during World
War 1.20 While they reminisced about the war, the agent asked
Sorrells three times for some liquor, hoping to catch Sorrells in
violation of laws prohibiting the possession of liquor.2' Upon the
third request, Sorrells produced a half gallon of liquor.22
While eight Supreme Court Justices agreed that Sorrells
should have the defense of entrapment,23 they divided sharply
"3 See Sorrells v United States, 287 US 435, 441 (1932) (stating that "[airtifice and
stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises"); United
States v Russell, 411 US 423, 436 (1973) (stating that "there are circumstances when the
use of deceit is the only practicable law enforcement technique available").
" See Sorrells, 287 US at 442 (recognizing that difficulties arise "when the criminal
design originates with the officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an
innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission
in order that they may prosecute").
" See notes 17-52 and accompanying text.
'6 Jonathan C. Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment
Defense, 73 Va L Rev 1011, 1032 (1987).
'7 287 US 435 (1932).
18 Id at 439.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Sorrells, 287 US at 439.
22 Id.
21 Justice McReynolds would have affirmed the lower court's decision to deny Sorrells
the entrapment defense. Id at 453.
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over both the proper test for entrapment and the theoretical
underpinnings of the defense. 4 Chief Justice Hughes delivered
the Court's opinion and set forth what would become the subjec-
tive test for entrapment. His opinion focused on determining who
instigated the criminal design." By focusing on the origin of the
criminal plan, Chief Justice Hughes invited scrutiny of the
defendant's character and predisposition. His concern was that
police action not lead "otherwise innocent" people to commit
crimes,6 and he believed that an examination of the "predisposi-
tion and criminal design of the defendant" would shed light on
whether the accused was in fact "otherwise innocent." 7
The Court revisited entrapment in Sherman v United
States.28 A five-justice majority confirmed the subjective test as
the law.29 Chief Justice Warren's opinion again highlighted the
doctrine's goal of protecting the innocent. He exhibited this con-
cern through his statement that "Congress could not have intend-
ed that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent
persons into violations.""° By depicting those ensnared by these
police tactics as innocent, he showed his reliance on the predispo-
sition criterion to ensure that those who are "otherwise innocent"
receive the defense.
The Court explored other aspects of the entrapment defense
in later decisions, but the majority opinions have continued to
apply the subjective test."' The latest Supreme Court decision
involving the entrapment defense is Jacobson v United States.2
In Jacobson, the Court further defined the predisposition require-
ment while continuing to show concern for both goals of the en-
trapment defense.
Jacobson concerned a government mail sting to catch pur-
chasers of child pornography.33 As part of this operation, the
government began sending surveys regarding sexual interests to
24 See notes 25-27 and notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
21 Sorrells, 287 US at 441.
2 Id at 448.
27 Id at 451.
356 US 369 (1958).
Id. A four-justice concurrence supported the objective test. See notes 47-49 and
accompanying text.
Id at 372.
"' See Russell, 411 US at 433; Hampton v United States, 425 US 484, 490 (1976);
Mathews v United States, 485 US 58, 63 (1988).
32 503 US 540 (1992).
3 Id at 542-47.
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Keith Jacobson, a farmer in Nebraska.34 He was the target of
the operation because he had ordered some material oriented
toward child pornography at a time when it was legal to order
such material.3' He also responded to some of the government's
surveys.3" After twenty-six months of repeated attempts by the
government to induce Jacobson to violate the child pornography
law, he ordered some pornographic material and was convict-
ed.37 The Supreme Court, however, concluded that the govern-
ment entrapped him. 8
The Court's analysis focused on the predisposition question.
The majority found that the government had not proven that
Jacobson's predisposition to order pornography "was independent
and not the product of the attention that the Government had
directed at petitioner."39 The majority, through its examination
of predisposition, evidenced its concern for ensuring the
government's actions do not entrap the innocent. It concluded
that a rational juror could not find that Jacobson's predisposition
to commit crime "existed independent of the Government's many
and varied approaches to [Jacobson]."'
B. The Objective Test for Entrapment
Although the Court has always applied the subjective test, a
history of vigorous minority endorsement of the objective test ex-
ists.4"' The objective test has a different focus and illustrates the
other goal of entrapment-to control law enforcement behavior.
Justice Roberts's concurring opinion in Sorrells set forth the
objective test."' The objective test emerges from his differing
view about the fundamental justification for the entrapment
defense. Justice Roberts advocated the entrapment defense to
protect the integrity of the judicial system rather than to effectu-
ate the intent of Congress.' For this reason, he did not under-
Id at 542, 544.
Id at 542-43.
Jacobson, 503 US at 543-44.
s' Id at 546-47.
Id at 542.
Id at 550.
Jacobson, 503 US at 553.
41 The following dissenting and concurring opinions used the objective test: Sorrells,
287 US at 458-59 (Roberts concurring); Sherman, 356 US at 382-83 (Frankfurter concur-
ring); Russell, 411 US at 436-37 (Douglas dissenting); Russell, 411 US at 439 (Stewart dis-
senting); and Hampton, 425 US at 496-97 (Brennan dissenting).
42 Sorrells, 287 US at 458-59 (Roberts concurring).
' Id at 457 (Roberts concurring).
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take to evaluate the predisposition or character of the defen-
dant." Rather, he focused exclusively on the actions of the gov-
ernment.'
Under the objective test, the jury scrutinizes the conduct of
law enforcement. By focusing on the actions of the government,
the jury provides a check on law enforcement. The nature of the
government's action determines whether upholding a conviction
would be a "prostitution of the criminal law."" Therefore, the
government must ensure that its actions do not constitute en-
trapment.
The objective test again found support when Justice Frank-
furter wrote a concurring opinion in Sherman urging the Court to
adopt the objective test.47 He set forth the objective test by stat-
ing that
in holding out inducements [law enforcement agents]
should act in such a manner as is likely to induce to the
commission of crime only [those engaged in criminal
conduct and ready and willing to commit further crimes
should the occasion arise] and not others who would
normally avoid crime and through self-struggle resist
ordinary temptations."
This formulation effectively eliminates consideration of a person's
predisposition to commit a crime and instead focuses on police
behavior and its effects on ordinary people.
Justice Frankfurter disagreed with the majority about the
appropriate test for entrapment, but his adoption of the objective
test shows his concern for controlling law enforcement behavior.
He exhibits this concern in the following statement: "The courts
refuse to convict an entrapped defendant, not because his conduct
falls outside the proscription of the statute, but because, even if
his guilt be admitted, the methods employed on behalf of the
Government to bring about conviction cannot be counte-
nanced." 9
The objective test appears to have died at the federal level in
the Jacobson decision, as neither the majority nor the minority
embraced its use.50 Many states" and the Model Penal Code,52
Id at 458 (Roberts concurring).
4 Id at 459 (Roberts concurring).
4 Sorrells, 287 US at 457 (Roberts concurring).
41 Sherman, 356 US at 382-83 (Frankfurter concurring).
41 Id at 383-84 (Frankfurter concurring).
41 Id at 380 (Frankfurter concurring).
'o See 503 US 540. Although Justice Brennan filed a concurring opinion in Mathews,
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however, have adopted the objective test for the reasons present-
ed above. This Comment will therefore evaluate the effectiveness
of both the subjective and objective tests as applied to undercover
activities in cyberspace.
II. NEITHER THE SUBJECTIVE NOR THE OBJECTIVE TEST
EFFECTUATES THE TWO PURPOSES OF ENTRAPMENT WHEN
APPLIED IN CYBERSPACE
A. The Subjective Test Will Not Protect the Innocent in
Cyberspace
The subjective test seeks to protect innocent defendants by
examining a defendant's predisposition-defined as "how the
defendant likely would have reacted to an ordinary opportunity
to commit the crime."53 While this test may protect defendants
who were not predisposed, it fails to prevent the harmful side
effects of a sting operation.
Being the target of a sting may provoke an individual to
reveal more about himself to the government than he otherwise
would. Child-pornography stings show this potential side effect of
undercover operations. At the beginning of some of these opera-
tions, the government sent out questionnaires to individuals
asking them to respond to a variety of inquiries. 4 Often the gov-
ernment took the individuals' names off mailing lists of pornogra-
phy operations that the government had recently investigated."5
485 US at 66 (Brennan concurring), stating that he was bowing to stare decisis and
accepting the subjective test, id at 67 (Brennan concurring), the case did not directly
concern the application of the entrapment defense. Jacobson therefore marks the first
time that the test for entrapment was squarely on the table and all the Justices used the
subjective test.
1 See Alaska Stat § 11.81.450 (1995); Ark Stat Ann § 5-2-209 (1993); 1986 Colo Rev
Stat § 18-1-709; Fla Stat Ann § 777.201 (West 1992); Hawaii Rev Stat § 702-237(1) (1985);
NJ Stat Ann § 2C:2-12a (West 1995); ND Cent Code § 12.1-05-11 (1985 and Supp 1995);
18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 313(a) (Purdon 1983); Tex Penal Code Ann § 8.06(a) (Vernon
1994); and Utah Code Ann § 76-2-303(1) (1995).
52 Model Penal Code § 2.13(1) (ALI 1962).
United States v Gendron, 18 F3d 955, 962 (1st Cir 1994). The opinion in Gendron
contains now-Justice Breyer's influential post-Jacobson formulation of the predisposition
test.
For example, in United States v Mitchell, 915 F2d 521, (9th Cir 1990), the govern-
ment sent a ten-part application asking the applicants to "express their attitudes toward
a broad spectrum of sexual and non-sexual activities." Id at 523. See also United States v
Byrd, 31 F3d 1329, 1331 (5th Cir 1994); United States v Chin, 934 F2d 393, 395 (2d Cir
1991).
In Mitchell, 915 F2d 521, for example, the government used records containing
thousands of names which law enforcement agents seized pursuant to the arrest of a
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The responses to these questionnaires narrowed the number of
people the sting continued to target.5" Although the effort
seemed laudable, the result was that many people unwittingly
revealed deeply personal information about themselves to public
officials.
The court noted that targeted individuals who are not predis-
posed will simply ignore the solicitation or questionnaire.57 This
claim, however, is not true in all instances. Some of the question-
naires are "designed to attract the interest of individuals possess-
ing..., a broad range of legal sexual and non-sexual inter-
ests."58 Because these operations cover many types of people and
ask about a broad range of issues, many non-predisposed people
may involuntarily reveal very private interests to the police.
The environment of cyberspace magnifies this problem. Law
enforcement officials in cyberspace might not face the same eco-
nomic constraints, such as printing and mailing costs, that force
them to use care in selecting targets outside cyberspace. The
costs of using a computer to distribute materials for testing and
identifying potential targets would be much lower than the use of
print material or human agents. The innocent in cyberspace
receive less protection from being the target of undercover opera-
tions under the subjective test.
B. The Subjective Test Will Not Control Law Enforcement
Officials in Cyberspace
In cyberspace, the subjective test for entrapment will exert
little control over police behavior. Child pornography stings often
select their targets from confiscated lists.5" Cyberspace allows
the generation of many more lists because of the high volume of
transactions recorded on computers that can sort the information
in various ways to create profiles of certain types of people. °
woman who purportedly controlled eighty percent of the United States market for child
pornography. Id at 525 n 5.
' In Mitchell, 915 F2d 521, the defendant was one of "thousands" to whom the
government sent a questionnaire. Id at 424-25. Law enforcement agents used responses to
the questionnaire to narrow the list to 1400 targets. Id at 525.
"7 The court in United States v Stanton, 973 F2d 608 (8th Cir 1992), made a point of
mentioning that the defendant "did not ignore the questionnaire or check a line at the top
of the questionnaire indicating he was disinterested [sic] and wished to be removed from
the mailing list." Id at 609.
Mitchell, 915 F2d at 524 n 4.
5' See notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
" A common example of such sorting is a supermarket with a system that scans the
customer's identity from a card before recording his purchases. The store receives a profile
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Although law enforcement has only limited access to transac-
tional data accumulated by businesses,6 it might be able to use
its own means to gather information about potential targets. One
author contends that the FBI maintained a program with librari-
ans to identify suspicious users of sensitive, unclassified material
who might conceivably represent a threat to the competitive or
security status of the United States.62 Cyberspace makes pos-
sible a more detailed accumulation of information about people
the government deems suspicious or dangerous. Currently, "'com-
panies can [ ] track trails of "mouse droppings" over the Internet,
finding out which Web sites you go to and for how long.' 63
Law enforcement might use information of this nature to
prove predisposition before government contact. If the use of such
information is accepted, law enforcement actions will be unre-
strained as courts will not place their activities under scrutiny.
Outside cyberspace, courts would occasionally scrutinize the
government's actions in an undercover operation when examining
predisposition.'In Jacobson v United States and United States v
Gifford, the courts looked at the contact the government had with
the individual to determine whether it contributed to the person's
disposition toward committing the crime." In this way, the
courts checked the types of operations conducted by the govern-
ment. If the government, however, may prove predisposition as or
before any contact occurs, courts will have no reason to examine
the nature of the government's contact, significantly reducing the
check on law enforcement behavior.
of purchases by the individual and uses that profile to make predictions about what
products might appeal to that customer. For an in-depth analysis of this type of activity,
see Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Information
(Westview Press, 1993).
01 The Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access
Act, 18 USC §§ 2701 et.seq (1994), requires that law enforcement agents have authoriza-
tion before accessing the transactional data of a business. 18 USC at § 2703.
' Herbert N. Foerstel, Surveillance in the Stacks: The FBI's Library Awareness
Program (Greenwood Press, 1991).
'6 Vic Sussman and Kenan Pollack, Gold Rush in Cyberspace, US News and World
Report 72, 78 (Nov 13, 1995) (quoting Larry Irving, Administrator of the National Tele-
communications and Information Administration).
" Jacobson v United States, 503 US 540, 550-553 (1992); United States v Gifford, 17
F3d 462, 468 (1st Cir 1994).
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C. The Objective Test Will Not Protect the Innocent in
Cyberspace
The objective test does no better than the subjective test in
protecting the innocent in cyberspace. The objective test exam-
ines the inducement offered by the government and evaluates its
effects on the ordinary or hypothetical person. 5 If the ordinary
person would commit the crime, the government has overreached,
and the defendant may raise the entrapment defense.
Defining the hypothetical "ordinary person" in cyberspace
will be difficult. One critic of the objective test applied outside
cyberspace questioned how one can measure the fortitude of the
average law-abiding citizen.6" Not only is determining who rep-
resents the average citizen difficult, determining the level of re-
sistance society expects beyond the standards in criminal laws is
also difficult.
Cyberspace shares these difficulties and presents even great-
er ones. In examining the effect of police behavior on the hypo-
thetical person, the court and jury assess the reasonableness of a
law enforcement officer's activity. Such assessments of reason-
ableness are more difficult in cyberspace because the jury "may
not know and may have no basis for knowing what is reasonable
in cyberspace."67
Although one commentator claims that tests involving a
hypothetical or "reasonable" person could translate into
cyberspace,68 these tests also have problems. Decisions about
what is reasonable depend on the members of the jury, and their
assessments of what is reasonable depend on their experienc-
es.69 Courts might, however, compensate for their lack of experi-
ence in cyberspace through expert witnesses and other testimony
concerning Internet practices and mores. °
Consider the following scenario regarding how the objective
test provides less protection for the innocent in cyberspace than
outside cyberspace. Imagine that law enforcement agents who are
See notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
Comment, Lead Us Not into (Unwarranted) Temptation: A Proposal to Replace the
Entrapment Defense with a Reasonable-Suspicion Requirement, 133 U Pa L Rev 1193,
1212 (1985).
7 I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace", 55 U Pitt L Rev 993,
1013 (1994).
Id.
See id at 1014.
70 See id at 1040-41 (discussing the use of custom to influence decisions concerning
reasonableness in cyberspace).
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hoping to catch software pirates place some copyrighted material
on the Internet and make it easy to download. The material also
contains some warnings about its copyrighted status. Upon dis-
covering this material, a user does not read the warnings because
much of what he has come across on the Internet has some intro-
duction, instruction, or advertisement; and he has found that
most of the time they are unimportant and unhelpful. He down-
loads the information. At his trial, he raises the entrapment
defense. Many difficult questions arise. For example, was the
offered software unusually attractive compared to what might
otherwise be available? How much of the material in similar
settings would be illegal to download? Was the warning adequate
compared to others on the Internet? Would most copyrighted
information made available have a warning so that a person
would know whether to be concerned?
These questions, among others, might influence a fact-
finder's decision about the effect of the government's action on an
ordinary person. Resolving them in court might mean that defen-
dants bear a great financial burden to provide expert witnesses.
Even if the person is found innocent, he will not have been
shielded from a long and expensive process.
D. The Objective Test Will Not Control Law Enforcement in
Cyberspace
The objective test, although designed to limit law enforce-
ment behavior, will do little to control law enforcement behavior
in cyberspace. The effectiveness of the test in controlling law
enforcement behavior depends in part on the court's issuing
guidelines to which the police can conform their behavior.71 No
current cases apply the entrapment defense in cyberspace, leav-
ing law enforcement without guidelines. Although this problem
may diminish as courts make decisions concerning entrapment in
cyberspace, no guidelines currently exist for police behavior.72
One possible solution would be to translate the guidelines
from the non-cyberspace objective standard to situations in
cyberspace. Many of these standards, however, do not translate.
For example, fostering sexual relationships to encourage crime is
7 See Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 Minn L Rev 163, 225 (1976).
7' Another problem which might arise is that the guidelines developed for entrap-
ment might not be objective but instead might be the result of public pressure to stop
crime at any cost. The stringency of the guidelines might vary directly with the public's
estimate of the seriousness of crime in cyberspace.
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generally outside the range of acceptable law enforcement behav-
ior in the real world.73 In cyberspace, sex is not possible in the
conventional sense. Would the offer of sexual favors be off limits
in cyberspace without a real chance of them occurring? If an
agent through words satisfies someone's desires, is such conduct
also off limits even though no physical contact occurred? Al-
though courts might eventually answer these questions, law
enforcement activity will proceed unguided until that point.
Similarly, the courts have consistently said that
beseechments to commit crime based primarily on "sympathy,
pity, or close personal friendship" likely constitute prohibited
activity under the objective test.74 Such a standard provides lit-
tle concrete guidance outside cyberspace and would provide even
less guidance if imported into cyberspace. For example, uncer-
tainty remains about whether correspondence with people on a
drug recovery bulletin board about getting drugs to ease with-
drawal would constitute an unacceptable play on sympathy. Also,
from whose perspective will the jury or judge examine whether a
close personal friendship existed-from the point of view of the
officer who was, in his mind, simply carrying on a series of con-
versations, or from the point of view of someone whose only con-
versational interaction with other people was over the computer?
The second person might have felt that anyone willing to spend
time communicating with her was a close friend for whom she
would do anything, including commit a crime. If this situation
were to occur outside cyberspace, the defendant would have en-
countered the undercover agent, and she would receive more
clues about the nature of the relationship from face-to-face con-
tact. In cyberspace, these clues are reduced. Interactions occur-
ring in cyberspace give law enforcement the potential to have
greater influence over a person while staying within the bound-
aries of current guidelines. The number of cues given to a target
is reduced. The result is that police conduct will not be deterred
7' Several courts have disapproved of officers fostering relationships with sexual over-
tones and then exploiting them to induce a person to commit crime. See Commonwealth v
Thompson, 335 Pa Super 332, 484 A2d 159, 166 (1984) (finding entrapment as a matter of
law where law enforcement used "a young, blonde female to coax a middle age [sic] male,
after months of kissing and socializing, into committing a minor crime"); People v
Wisneski, 96 Mich App 299, 292 NW2d 196, 199 (1980) (stating that "[p]olice en-
couragement of an agent's use of sex to induce one who is unwilling and unready to
commit a crime constitutes entrapment").
" See, for example, Grossman v State, 457 P2d 226, 230 (Alaska 1969); State v
Mullen, 216 NW2d 375, 383 (Iowa 1974); State v Taylor, 599 P2d 496, 503 (Utah 1979).
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in these situations by applying the standards generated from the
application of the objective test in the real world.
III. A REASONABLE-SUSPICION STANDARD EFFECTIVELY
ADDRESSES THE PROBLEMS OF THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE IN
CYBERSPACE
Legislatures and courts should replace the entrapment de-
fense with a requirement that law enforcement officials prove a
reasonable suspicion that the target of an undercover operation
has engaged in or is likely to engage in criminal activity. They
should also have to show that an undercover operation is related
to the suspected illegal activity of the target and that the scope of
their operation is limited to its object.
Some members of the Supreme Court have not responded
favorably to arguments for a reasonable-suspicion standard. In
Jacobson, Justice O'Connor's dissent accused the majority of
imposing what she interpreted to be a reasonable-suspicion re-
quirement on law enforcement." Several lower courts have also
shown disfavor toward adopting a reasonable-suspicion stan-
dard.7
6
The reasonable-suspicion standard, however, has found sup-
port outside the courts. Several commentators have endorsed
it.77 After the Abscam series of entrapment cases, Congress in-
vestigated the entrapment doctrine. Committees in both houses
concluded that a reasonable-suspicion requirement was neces-
sary.7" Additionally, the Attorney General's own guidelines re-
5 Jacobson v United States, 503 US 540, 556 (1992) (O'Connor dissenting).
7 See United States v Harvey, 991 F2d 981, 990 (2d Cir 1993) (rejecting a reasonable-
suspicion requirement and noting that the weight of authority rejects a constitutional
requirement of reasonable basis or suspicion).
" See Comment, Lead Us Not into (Unwarranted) Temptation: A Proposal to Replace
the Entrapment Defense with a Reasonable-Suspicion Requirement, 133 U Pa L Rev 1193,
1216 (1985); Note, The Government as Pornographer: Government Sting Operations and
Entrapment: United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S.Ct. 1535
(1992), 61 U Cin L Rev 1067, 1089 (1993); Note, Executive Targeting of Congressmen as a
Violation of the Arrest Clause, 94 Yale L J 647, 667-68 (1985)(recommending a reasonable-
suspicion standard for undercover operations targeting members of Congress); Comment,
If the Postman Always "Stings" Twice, Who Is the Next Target?-An Examination of the
Entrapment Theory, 19 J Contemp L 217, 244 (1993); Note, United States v. Jacobson: A
Call for Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity as a Threshold Limitation on Govern-
mental Sting Operations, 44 Ark L Rev 493, 510 (1991).
78 See FBI Undercover Operations, HR Rep No 98-267, 98th Cong, 2d Seis 84 (1984)
("House Report"); Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Undercover Activities of
Components of the Department of Justice, S Rep No 97-682, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 1, 377-89
(1983) ("Senate Report").
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quire a reasonable "indication" of illegal activites before the com-
mencement of undercover operations.79
In the face of judicial reluctance to modify the entrapment
standard, the proper body to change the entrapment standard is
the legislature. 0 The Supreme Court in United States v Russell
acknowledged that "Congress may address itself to the question
[of entrapment] and adopt any substantive definition of the de-
fense that it may find desirable.""
The House Subcommittee that investigated undercover oper-
ations after Abscam recommended legislation that would require
law enforcement to meet a reasonable-suspicion standard and
receive judicial authorization prior to engaging in undercover
operations. 2 Senator Mathias introduced a bill addressing these
concerns to the Senate floor shortly after the Abscam cases, but
it died in the Judiciary Committee. 3 The greater problems with
the entrapment defense in cyberspace should provide the impetus
for Congress to revisit its earlier conclusions and act on them by
passing legislation requiring prior judicial approval of undercover
operations based on the reasonable-suspicion standard.
Under this requirement, law enforcement officers would have
to seek judicial approval for an operation by showing that they
had reason to believe that an individual had engaged or would
engage in criminal activity. They would also have to outline the
scope of the activity and the goals of their undercover operation.
The request for authorization would describe the types of induce-
ments the undercover operation would employ so the judge or
magistrate could evaluate their appropriateness.
The reasonable-suspicion requirement would protect the
innocent in cyberspace. It would resolve the problem of the sub-
jective test-innocent people revealing more information to the
government than they otherwise would-by limiting the scope of
undercover operations. The government should not be able to cast
a broad net hoping to catch a few criminals. Instead, operations
would focus only on those who meet the reasonable-suspicion
standard, thereby protecting a large number of innocent people
from revealing private information.
7 Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, The Attorney General's
Guidelines on Criminal Investigations of Individuals and Organizations, reprinted in S
Rep No 97-682, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 504, 507 (1983).
so See note 75 and accompanying text.
8! United States v Russell, 411 US 423, 433 (1973).
82 House Report at 84 (cited in note 78).
' Cong Index 14,187 and 20,505 (CCH 97th Cong Senate. 1983-84).
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Jacobson illustrates how the reasonable-suspicion require-
ment would protect the innocent. Jacobson's name came from the
mailing list of a pornography operation.' In cyberspace, the gov-
ernment might get lists of names from records of computer activi-
ty. At the very least, a reasonable-suspicion standard would re-
quire an examination of the reliability of such lists. If the people
running the undercover operation had known that the activity
which placed Jacobson's name on the list was legal at the time he
did it, perhaps they would not have targeted him.85 A reason-
able-suspicion standard will require the government to examine
the legality of the activity that places peoples names on lists in
cyberspace to ensure that the activities are ones that would raise
a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.
The reasonable-suspicion test would also address the prob-
lem that the objective test had with protecting the innocent.86
The judge's focus would switch from the "hypothetical" or "ordi-
nary" person to the appropriateness of the operation in light of
its individual circumstances. Judges could thus account for the
effects that the environment of cyberspace has on the appropri-
ateness of the operation's activities.
The reasonable-suspicion test would act as a check on law
enforcement conduct. The problem with the subjective test's abili-
ty to control law enforcement behavior in cyberspace is that the
information collection and sorting ability that cyberspace pro-
vides makes predisposition an easy obstacle to clear. Under a
reasonable-suspicion standard, judges would examine the reasons
to target people before an operation began, thereby controlling
law enforcement. The government would not be able to undertake
operations to catch individuals without much evidence of predis-
position, hoping that the court would later approve its actions to
avoid the embarassment of letting someone involved in child
pornography go free.
In the same way that judges analyze the scope of a search
with regard to its object,87 judges should analyze scope of an un-
Jacobson, 503 US at 543.
The magazine that Jacobson ordered from the company was not illegal at the time
he ordered it, and there was no indication that he ordered material of a similar nature
once it became illegal. Jacobson, 503 US at 551.
80 See notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
17 The scope of a warrant is limited by the requirement of particularity. When execut-
ing a warrant, police must identify the object and location of their search and justify it by
providing information regarding probable cause. See Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Search and Sei-
zure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.5 at 513 and § 4.10 at 653 (West, 3d ed
1996).
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dercover operation to ensure that its activities are limited to
those relevant to achieving its goals. Although not every detail of
an undercover operation could be predicted, it could be described
in general terms and authorization could be granted for a range
of actions.8 For example, in authorizing an operation, a judge
could limit law enforcement to offering certain types of induce-
ments which are not excessive,89 in light of the peculiar circum-
stances of cyberspace. This type of scrutiny would provide law
enforcement with the incentive to make the operation as narrow
as possible while still catching the person suspected of wrongdo-
ing.
A difficulty with the reasonable-suspicion requirement lies in
determining who would decide whether there is reasonable suspi-
cion and examine the scope of an undercover operation. The
House Subcommittee and Senate Committee differed over who
should authorize undercover operations based on reasonable
suspicion. The House advocated authorization from the judicial
branch9 ° while the Senate proposed authorization by the execu-
tive branch.91 Similarly, some commentators advocate judicial
involvement,92 while other sources strongly reject prior judicial
approval.93
Requiring judicial approval would best protect the innocent
and control law enforcement behavior. The House Subcommittee
advocated judicial approval of undercover operations because
agencies were not enforcing their internal guidelines in a mean-
ingful way.94 This determination is not surprising because a law
enforcement agency has little incentive to police itself, and the
head or review board of the agency has the authority to interpret
the guidelines.95 Although "reasonable suspicion" has a devel-
oped meaning in the judicial arena, the agency can interpret the
" But see Katherine Goldwasser, After Abscam: An Examination of Congressional Pro-
posals to Limit Targeting Discretion in Federal Undercover Investigations, 36 Emory L J
75, 129-30 (1987).
' For example, the court could look at the factors delineated in United States v
Gendron, 18 F3d 955, 961-62 (1st Cir 1994), to ensure that law enforcement's actions are
not excessive.
'0 House Report at 83-84 (cited in note 78).
" Senate Report at 25 (cited in note 78).
92 See, for example, Comment, 133 U Pa L Rev at 1217-19 (cited in note 77).
"' See ABA Report of Section of Criminal Justice Regarding Undercover Operations
(1987), reprinted in Paul Marcus, The Entrapment Defense § 12.27 at 678 (Michie, 1989).
94 House Report at 84 (cited in note 78).
" See Gary T. Marx, Undercover: Police Surveillance in America 184 (University of
California Press, 1988) (noting that a weakness of internal guidelines is that the agencies
themselves interpret the guidelines).
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term in a way that is favorable to its interests. Also, since the
violation of an agency's internal guideline might not result in any
penalty, even a rigorously defined standard of reasonable suspi-
cion might have little or no deterrent effect on law enforcement
behavior.96
The Senate Report raised a number of objections to judicial
approval. 7 It noted that undercover operations are fast-moving,
requiring quick decisions.98 While internal enforcement of guide-
lines might result in quicker action, rapid internal review is
unlikely to be more than a rubber stamp of field officers' deci-
sions. The Report also raised institutional objections to judicial
involvement. The Report showed concern that the judicial system
will be placing a "pre-operation imprimatur" on undercover oper-
ations by making determinations about the scope of undercover
operations which the judicial system would have to review.9
However, the same result occurs when judges issue warrants
which judges might review at a later stage. Additionally, the Re-
port argued that a judicially administered standard would add to
the congestion of the courts.00 This argument may be true, but
the additional protection of the innocent would outweigh any
additional judicial burden.
CONCLUSION
The entrapment defense developed to prevent law enforce-
ment officials from inducing the otherwise innocent to commit
crimes and to prevent them from overreaching their authority.
Neither of the tests developed for entrapment, however, ade-
quately accomplishes these goals when applied in cyberspace.
Replacing the entrapment defense with the requirement that law
enforcement have reasonable suspicion before engaging in an
undercover activity would ensure that the policies undergirding
the entrapment defense translate in cyberspace. Such a standard,
by requiring that law enforcement show that the target is likely
to commit a crime, protects the innocent and allows courts to
scrutinize law enforcement officials to ensure that they stay with-
in the scope of their authority.
Id.
Senate Report at 387-89 (cited in note 78).
'8 Id at 388-89.
Id at 389.
0 Id at 389.

